



JOINT INSPECTION
TEAM FOR BUILDING
SAFETY (WALES) LTD

REPORT OF INSPECTION 2024/5

by Joint Inspection Team for Building Safety (JIT)

**GARTH COURT,
Abbey Road, Llandudno. LL30 2HF**



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INSPECTION REPORT 2024/5

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
GARTH COURT,
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INTRODUCTION



LOCAL AUTHORITY:	CONWY COUNTY BOROUGH COUNCIL
Name of Building	Garth Court
Address of Building	Garth Court, Abbey Road, Llandudno. LL30 2HF
Year of Construction	Circa 1975
Date of inspection	17/06/2025 – 19/06/2025

INSPECTION TEAM:	JIT
Name	Role
Tom Marchant	Principal Fire Engineer
Russ McGrath	Principal Fire Safety Adviser
Kyle Higgins	Principal Building Control Adviser
Rob Ellison	Principal Environmental Health Adviser
Dawood Haddadi	Head of JIT



FACILITIES TEAM

Name	Role
Danielle O'Brien	Compliance Team / Director – Managing Estates Ltd
Kevin Gardener	Caretaker

PART ONE:

1.0 Background

- 1.1 This report is based upon observations of members of the Joint Inspection Team for Building safety (Wales) Ltd. The inspection was undertaken to the common parts and within a sample of flats at Garth Court, Abbey Road, Llandudno. LL30 2HF on the 17/06/2025 – 19/06/2025 between the hours of 8:00 am and 8:00 pm.

2.0 Building Description

- 2.1 Garth Court development was constructed around 1975 and consists of residential tower blocks, with 9 levels including a ground floor car park. The building is of reinforced concrete construction and are served by a single stair core and 1 lift, which provide access to all residential floors.
- 2.2 Garth Court comprises 22 self-contained apartments, with 4 apartments per floor from level 2 - 5, and 2 self-contained apartments from floor 6 - 8.
- 2.3 The blocks follow a standard layout, with all upper floors containing similar arrangements, each accessible via a protected lobby. 1 lift is present within the building, providing vertical access alongside the stair core.
- 2.4 The finished floor level of the top occupied storey is approximately 25m above the ground level carpark.
- 2.5 Garth Court building has a rectangular shape that is a stepped block in height meaning the shape changes at different levels, but the lobbies and corridors connect the flats in a typical rectangular shape. The primary elevations face the surrounding residential estate, and the design consists of communal corridors on each floor, serving flats per level apart from the lower ground and ground floor levels where there is an entrance lobby and caretaker's office on the ground floor and a carpark on the lower ground floor. The lift sits within the ground-floor entrance lobby and opens in the east corridor of the upper floors; it does not serve the lower ground floor car park. A single stair core provides vertical circulation towards the north elevation, with fire service access available via Abbey Road, ensuring emergency access.

BUILDING OCCUPATION

- 2.6 There is a total of 22 apartments with a mix in size and layout that consists of a range of 3- and 2-bedroom flats.
- 2.7 The building's freehold is held by Mostyn Estates, and the flats are largely owned by leaseholders who live in them.
- 2.8 The resident profile is general needs, primarily made up of older adults including a number of leaseholders of retirement age, though with a mix of working age individuals. The building is not designated as sheltered or supported housing.

- 2.9 The building is currently operating under a simultaneous evacuation strategy, whereby all occupants are expected to evacuate upon activation of the fire alarm system. Given the condition of the building, including the identified shortfalls the JIT recommends that this evacuation strategy remains in place. Until such time as the fire safety measures are upgraded to support a more robust stay put approach, maintaining simultaneous evacuation is considered appropriate to reduce risk to occupants in the event of a fire.

Floor numbers for flat numbers

GARTH COURT				
2ND. FLOOR. FLAT. NO ^s .	1.	2.	3.	4.
3RD.	"	"	"	"
4TH.	"	"	"	"
5TH.	"	"	"	"
6TH.	"	"	"	"
7TH.	"	"	"	"
8TH.	"	"	"	"

3.0 SCOPE OF INSPECTION

- 3.1 This report is based on a visual inspection of the accessible areas of the premises over a 3-day period. No intrusive or destructive examinations were carried out; however, inspection doors were used to access service voids where available.
- 3.2 This inspection was not undertaken as part of a full building structural or pathological survey, and deficiencies noted herein do not reflect a full schedule of defects.
- 3.3 Access was not granted to all areas within all of the blocks at the time of inspection. Unless explicitly mentioned within this report it should be assumed that specific areas omitted were not available to inspect at the time. No lifting or moving of furniture, or appliances will have been attempted. Limited access to service voids should be assumed to provide a reasonable sample of the areas of the building where access was granted, (circa 10%).
- 3.4 The inspection was primarily carried out to determine whether a fire safety hazard exists at the property under Part 1 of The Housing Act 2004, assessed by way of the Housing Health and Safety Rating System (HHSRS) methods. No defects relating to other hazards outside of HHSRS were formally assessed.

4.0 TERMINOLOGY

- 4.1 Floor levels are referenced according to the designations found in the building. The main front entrance/ exit door from the ground floor leads onto the path along the site road.
- 4.2 There is vehicular access and egress to the car park from Abbey Road.
- 4.3 The terms 'flat' and 'apartment' are used interchangeably throughout this report.
- 4.4 HHSRS - The Housing Health and Safety Rating System, is the main statutory method of assessing housing health and safety conditions within England and Wales, across all residential tenures.
- 4.5 Deficiency - This is a failure of a constructed element to meet the Ideal, i.e. the perceived optimum standard, at the time of the assessment, intended to prevent, avoid or minimise the hazard.
- 4.6 Hazard - any risk of harm to the health or safety of an actual or potential occupier, or visitor that arises from a deficiency.
- 4.7 Hazard Score and Rating – The Hazard Score is a numerical representation of the overall risk from a hazard. It is based on the evaluation of the likelihood of a harmful occurrence and of the probable spread of harms that could result. The Hazard Rating is the Band into which the Hazard Score falls. Hazard Bands range from A - J, with Bands A - C defining category 1 hazards (the most serious), and Bands D – J defining category 2 hazards, which are less serious in nature. All premises will contain a range of residual category 2 hazards even where the risk is considered very low for such hazards, (i.e. bands F - J).

- 4.8 Health - This is an individual's state of physical, mental and social well-being. It is not limited to the presence or absence of disease, infirmity or physical injury, but includes psychological injuries and distress.
- 4.9 Risk - The combination of the likelihood of an occurrence and the spread of harms resulting during the following twelve-month period. For the purposes of the HHSRS this is expressed as the Hazard Score and Hazard Rating.
- 4.10 The Vulnerable Group - A range of people for whom the risk arising from a hazard is greater than for any other age group in the population. Where there is no vulnerable group for a specific hazard, the population is taken as a whole. Vulnerability to hazards is restricted to age groups. It does not extend to vulnerability for other reasons.
- 4.11 Fire Terminology is available within BS EN ISO 13943 / BS EN 4422: 2024.

5.0 INTELLIGENCE ACQUIRED

- 5.1 The JIT would like to point out that the voluntary basis of this inspection was at the invitation of the managing agent Managing Estates Ltd. No statutory notices requiring specific information / documents, or notices requiring access to the individual apartments were used for this inspection. All documentation requested was freely volunteered by Managing Estates Ltd. The JIT would like to extend its gratitude for the cooperation of Managing Estates Ltd, throughout the course of this inspection process.
- 5.2 The JIT had received background information from the Welsh Government and North Wales Fire and Rescue Service ahead of this inspection.
- 5.3 Some of the required documents were provided to JIT prior to the inspection date by Managing Estates Ltd, managing agent team. The JIT was therefore able to consider a range of documentary intelligence prior to the inspection.
- 5.4 If any of this documentation deemed necessary but not provided at the time of this report, is subsequently provided to the JIT at a later date, the JIT reserves the right to consider reviewing or reassessing the hazard rating accordingly.
- 5.5 A list of key documentation that was received by the JIT prior to the inspection date are detailed in Appendix Two of this report.

6.0 RESPONSIBLE/INTERESTED PARTIES

6.1 The following information was provided, with regards to responsible and interested parties:

Current Freeholder:	Mostyn Estates
Original Developer:	Pochin Contractors Ltd – No longer trading
Managing Agent for Freeholder:	Estates Management Ltd
Principal contractors:	Pochin Contractors Ltd – No longer trading
Fire Strategy:	None
Current Fire Risk Assessment:	Snowdonia Fire & Security – April 2023

6.2 There has been no further investigation into responsible and interested parties undertaken by the JIT.

7.0 METHODOLOGY

7.1 Access to the common areas, riser cupboards, utility rooms and flats was facilitated with assistance from the property caretaker.

7.2 Inspection of the openable vent system (i.e. windows) was facilitated with assistance from the property caretaker.

7.3 Measurements and photographs were taken throughout the inspection. Any photographs referenced within the body of the report may be made available to designated parties upon request. This will be strictly at the discretion of the JIT.

QUALITY ASSURANCE

7.4 The Welsh JIT have a robust and standardised quality assurance process in place for the production of all reports. Following production of the report by the team, the report undergoes a three stage QA process:

- 1 - Initially the report will be reviewed by the report authors, for grammar, spelling and layout.
- 2 - The second stage is a peer review by either the Senior or Principal Fire professional for technical accuracy and clarity of recommendations.
- 3 - Thirdly the report is shared with the building management for clarification or omissions.

It is only at this stage that the report is shared with the Communications Advisor for graphic design and layout.

No reports are issued without going through this QA process, and from time to time, the Welsh JIT requests an enforcement professional to undertake a critical review of the final version prior to general release.

8.0 ACCESS

8.1 Access was obtained to the following flats:

Apartment	Floor	Location
16	5	Garth Court
10	4	Garth Court
7	3	Garth Court
20	7	Garth Court
21	7	Garth Court
19	6	Garth Court

.2 Access was gained to all floors of the building comprising the following areas:

- A sample of riser cupboards (see Appendix Three)
- A large sample of residential corridors (voids within common parts areas)
- The car parks, plant rooms and bin storage areas
- The shared common parts

8.3 The external facades and elevations were examined visually from the following locations:

- Ground level from all aspects
- From windows in corridors, stairs and from within a small number of flats

PART TWO: OBSERVATIONS

9.0 OBSERVATIONS – EXTERNAL

- 9.1 Garth Court is constructed using a reinforced concrete structural frame, forming the primary load bearing framework. The external walls were originally built with a brick outer leaf, a cavity, and a masonry inner leaf, tied to the concrete frame

The floors are constructed using a reinforced concrete T-beam system with clay block infill units and finished with a concrete screed.

The roof is formed in a mansard configuration, with steeply sloped sections to each elevation and a metal roof deck. The primary structure consists of steel framing, with jack rafters formed in timber spanning between the main steel sections to support the roof build up. Insulation and a waterproof membrane are laid over the metal decking to form the finished surface. The roof edge finishes directly at the top of the sloped mansard.

uPVC glazing is incorporated within all elevations, including the mansard wall profile.


A visual examination of the building determined that the external elevations likely consisted of a mixture of:

- Masonry 65%
- Glazing with uPVC frames (estimated at 20%)
- Flat roofing and wall systems (estimated at 15%)

- 9.2 Glazed areas with uPVC frames appeared to consist of glass and plastic components.

- 9.3 At Garth Court, recent works to the mansard section have raised concerns regarding the fire performance of the waterproofing system applied. The building features a steeply pitched mansard roof which, due to its angle and adjacency to occupied flats, falls within the definition of an external wall. Initial planning applications had been submitted for a full roof renewal, which would have included replacement of the entire structure. However, the most recent application proposed a scaled back scope of works, resulting in a more limited refurbishment approach. We have engaged with the local authority building control team, who provided their justification for accepting the revised works, including correspondence with stakeholders involved in the project. Although we have not seen a formal completion certificate, and no response has been received to our most recent communication outlining these concerns in full, the matter remains unresolved from a fire performance standpoint.

While the works have been framed as a like for like repair and the intention was not to alter the structure, the material used, Duracoat, is a polymer-based product containing solvents and is not supported by test data for use on vertical or near vertical wall applications. Although it has achieved BROOF(t4) under UK standards for flat roofing, this test is not recognised under EN 13501 for wall applications, and the product carries no Euroclass fire rating. Based on its composition, it would likely achieve a classification no better than Class D to F. The current BBA certificate for Duracoat clearly states it is not suitable for use on walls, which is significant given the fire risk associated with the mansard (wall) construction build-up.




The original build up likely included a bitumen felt with mineral finish, which may have achieved potentially low-class D with the mineral finish. However, this was laid over combustible backing materials typical of the construction era, such as OSB sheathing, EPS insulation, and wood wool board known as Tectum board, all of which contribute to fire loading and propagation. Importantly, while bitumen is combustible, it is a heavier oil derived material lower down the refining chain. In that sense, it behaves more like diesel when compared to highly volatile substances like petrol. Bitumen tends to ignite more slowly, requiring sustained exposure to heat before combustion, and typically has a more stable and delayed burn profile. In contrast, solvent based and polymeric coatings such as Duracoat are more volatile and can ignite quickly, increasing the rate of fire development.


While Circular Letter 2011 provided guidance on thermal upgrades and flat roof repairs under Part L - https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a7b8f6040f0b62826a045de/110622-Divisional_circular_letter_about_the_Building_-_Amendment_Regulations_2011.pdf, it did not address fire performance and was written at a time when fire risk in external wall systems was less understood. From a regulatory point of view, the key consideration is whether the works would make the building less compliant with Schedule 1. Under Regulation 3 of the Building Regulations, this would constitute a material alteration. If the original felt system had a higher or similar level of resistance than the new Duracoat product, and no test evidence supports equivalence, this may reduce compliance under Part B. Regulation 7 paragraph 2 (g) allows for membrane exemptions, but this relies on proportionate application and assumes that all materials behind the membrane are non-combustible or of limited combustibility. In this case, that assumption does not hold due to the presence of combustible materials within the mansard build-up.

The decision not to treat the works as a material alteration appears to have been based on assumptions rather than on performance data.

The JIT believes the fire resistance of the mansard section has been marginally reduced and that overall fire risk has slightly increased as a result. This case presents an opportunity for learning and reflection, particularly where pitched surfaces form part of the external wall. It highlights the need to apply a more precautionary approach when substituting materials that lack test evidence or Euroclass ratings, and to reconsider the threshold between repair and alteration where fire safety is concerned.



- 9.4 The building is served by lower ground floor car parking, storage units that attach around part of the perimeter of the basement floor, that includes area like MEP rooms. They have their own dedicated access and egress points, separating them from the residential areas.
- 9.5 No lightning protection system was observed during the inspection at Garth Court. The building is a high-rise residential block with a combination of combustible and conductive materials at roof level, increasing its vulnerability to lightning strikes. In line with BS EN 62305-2:2012, a formal risk assessment should be undertaken to determine whether protection is required. Given the height, occupancy, and construction of the building, it is likely that protection measures would be recommended and should be addressed by the responsible person.
- 9.6 The lower ground floor car park is open sided, providing some natural ventilation, but several fire safety concerns were noted. There were multiple holes in the soffit of the floor slabs, including visible damage to the clay infill blocks and unsealed service penetrations. Soil stacks running through the area lacked fire collars at the slab junctions, leaving openings that compromise vertical compartmentation between floors. The general condition of the car park was poor, with signs of disrepair and inadequate house keeping, including the storage of combustible materials and general waste. The presence of electric vehicles introduces an increased fire risk, particularly due to the high energy release and difficulty of extinguishment associated with battery fires. In its current condition, the car park presents a number of risks that should be addressed through improved maintenance, reinstatement of passive fire protection, and a clear strategy for managing EV and ICE vehicle fire hazards.







- 9.7 Scaffolding has been in place around the building for approximately 2 years, originally erected to support roofing works. At the time of inspection, there were no confirmed plans for its removal, as further verification of the completed roof works remains outstanding. The extended retention of the scaffold still presents a potential fire risk. The structure can provide a means for external fire spread between levels. Given the duration of its presence and the uncertainty around completion timelines, the scaffold arrangement should be reviewed as part of the fire risk assessment, and appropriate control measures considered.



- 9.8 The bin chute formerly discharged into the waste storage room located at 1st floor level, where a manual chute shut off door remains in place. The chute has since been decommissioned, with the rear section sealed using expanding foam. This room has been repurposed as a general storage area and was observed to contain a notable quantity of combustible materials, including paints, cleaning products, plastic containers, and other general fire loading. The room is fitted with a fire alarm device, providing local detection coverage, and access is via double doors with louvred ventilation, offering some passive smoke dispersal. The original waste chute hoppers on each floor are likely behind a stud partition wall adjacent to the stair lobby.

The bins are now stored externally along the north elevation of the building in an area that is open and accessible to the public. While the space is covered by CCTV surveillance, its open nature presents a potential risk of arson, deliberate interference, or vandalism. The presence of combustible refuse in an unsecured area adjacent to the building increases exposure, particularly given the potential for ignition sources and the proximity to occupied flats. The arrangement should be reviewed to determine whether additional physical security measures or enclosure would be appropriate to reduce the risk.



ACCESS AND FACILITIES FOR FIRE FIGHTERS

- 9.9 Garth Court flats are accessed via Abbey Road, which serves as the primary route for vehicle access. This allows firefighting vehicles to reach the South elevation of the block, within 18 metres of the dry riser inlet. The North elevation forms a dead end.

Firefighting activities are expected to be conducted primarily internally, using the designated firefighting shaft, the stair width of this building was 780mm, which falls below the expected 1100mm for firefighting access and egress.

A single fireman's lift is provided within the block and appears to be original to the building. During the inspection, the lift was fully operational, and the JIT was able to take control using the designated switch located behind a break glass panel. No faults were present at the time of the visit, and the lift responded as expected when placed into fireman's service mode. However, the managing agent was unable to provide any LOLER (Lifting Operations and Lifting Equipment Regulations 1998) test certificates. These statutory certificates confirm that the lift has been inspected by a competent person at the required intervals. The absence of current documentation raises concerns about compliance and assurance of ongoing safe use, particularly as this is the only lift available for fire service operations in the event of an incident.

A dry riser system is installed within the building, with landing valves provided at every storey within the stair core. The dry riser inlet is positioned within the covered lower ground floor car park area, beyond 18 metres of likely FRS appliance parking. The inlet was not located in a prominent location which could be seen by the FRS externally, on their approach to the building. During the inspection, it was noted that the inlet housing appeared weathered and was without signage, making it difficult to identify; with visible signs of corrosion to the metalwork, raising concerns over long term durability and maintenance. No evidence was provided to confirm that a recent or any pressure or flow test of the dry riser system had been carried out in recent years. In the absence of a valid test certificate, assurance cannot be given that the system would perform as required during an emergency.



LOCATION OF FIRE HYDRANT

- 9.10 There were four fire hydrants present within 90 metres of the Garth court building. The closest fire hydrant is positioned on the west elevation approximately 20 metres from the dry riser inlet, set within the side street road area outside the car park vehicular access and egress point.
- The closest hydrant is positioned to facilitate straightforward access without the need to disrupt major traffic routes, as hoses can be deployed through the surrounding access roads and open spaces rather than obstructing main carriageways.

10.0 OBSERVATIONS – INTERNAL

- 10.1 A visual examination of Garth Court Flats indicates that the primary structure is composed of a reinforced concrete frame, with floors formed using precast concrete T-beams infilled with clay blocks and finished with a concrete screed. The roof follows a mansard configuration, with steeply sloped sections supported by a steel frame incorporating timber jack rafters. These sloped areas are overlaid with sheathing, insulation, and a waterproof membrane, while the central upper section is finished with a flat deck. The external walls are constructed from concrete blockwork positioned between the reinforced concrete, and internal partitions are also formed in masonry. While this construction method reflects the original design intent and offers inherent fire resistance to key loadbearing elements, it should be noted that the original floor construction may not meet current standards for structural performance or fire resistance. This is particularly relevant given observed signs of delamination and general disrepair to areas of the floor construction, which may affect the integrity and reliability of the floor construction when assessed against modern performance standards.

- 10.2 A visual inspection identified concrete spalling and exposed corroded reinforcement, primarily within the lower ground floor level car park areas. The deterioration observed is characteristic of chloride induced corrosion or carbonation breakdown, where moisture penetration has led to localised rusting of reinforcement, causing cracking and delamination of the concrete cover. The lower ground floor car park areas are more susceptible to humidity, temperature variations, and potential exposure to corrosive substances, which could accelerate further degradation if left unaddressed.

The structural integrity and fire resistance remain intact at present; ongoing deterioration could compromise the performance of affected elements over time. Routine maintenance should be carried out to address these defects. The JIT recommends that these areas are investigated and repaired by a competent contractor.

- 10.3 Internal walls within the residential flats and common areas are predominantly constructed using multiple masonry materials and dry lined, providing structural integrity and fire resistance.

- 10.4 Service penetrations from the basement, including soil stacks and ventilation ductwork, were observed running vertically throughout the building. These services pass through a number of flats, typically serving drainage connections to bathrooms and kitchens, as well as ventilation systems. The route of these penetrations appears to follow a continuous vertical alignment with no clear evidence of fire compartmentation at each floor level. In the roof space, the JIT observed that these service runs likely continue unchecked, with no visible fire stopping and a noticeable draft present, suggesting a lack of enclosure and air movement through the vertical service path. As far as could be seen, there were no barriers or fire resisting construction present to contain the spread of fire or smoke along this route. This arrangement presents a significant concern, as it undermines vertical fire separation and may allow a fire in one flat or lower level to spread rapidly through the building via the service void. Remedial works should be undertaken to identify all points of penetration and ensure effective compartmentation is reinstated in line with current fire safety standards.



- 10.5 The lobbies between the landing corridors and the stairwell at Garth Court are fitted with notional FD30s doors, which appeared to be in good condition and functioning as intended. The doors leading into the stair core were notional 60-minute FR, but with varying surface finishes.
- 10.6 Flat entrance doors throughout the building were of mixed construction and not aligned with current guidance standards. Several doors appeared to be of notional 30-minute FR, timber construction, fitted with Perko style chain closers and lacking intumescent strips and cold smoke seals. Others were of lightweight honeycomb design, offering limited fire resistance and commonly lacking self-closing devices. Riser cupboard doors were of similar construction, with no evidence of intumescent protection or closers.
- 10.7 These conditions reduce the effectiveness of compartmentation and increase the potential for early fire and smoke spread into communal areas. The Fire Risk Assessment alluded to this in 2023, but no evidence was provided that actions were carried out.
- 10.8 The building is equipped with a single full height staircase, serving as the primary protected means of escape for all floors. The stair core benefits from permanent natural ventilation, provided by two continuous ventilation strips running externally from the first floor up to the top of the building.
- 10.9 The building is equipped with a dry riser system, with landing valves located on floor 1 - 8 within the main access corridor east. The dry riser inlet is positioned externally in the car park area on the north elevation, within 18 metres of likely fire appliance parking. During the inspection, the inlet housing was observed to be in a weathered condition, with visible signs of corrosion to the metal components, raising concerns about its long-term reliability. No documentation was provided to confirm that a recent or any pressure or flow test had been carried out in accordance with BS 9990, and without such evidence, assurance cannot be given that the system would operate effectively in an emergency. While the riser serves all floors within the 45-metre hose reach, the current condition of the inlet and the absence of test certification present clear risks that should be addressed without delay.
- 10.10 The building is serviced by 1 fireman's lift, which is accessed within each floor level corridor and the ground floor lobby area.
- 10.11 The Open Vent (OV) system is as stated above, and corridors have openable windows.
- 10.12 A number of electrical cables within service cupboards were inadequately supported, lacking proper conduit or fire-rated clips¹.

¹ BS 7671 IET 18th Edition, Requirements for Electrical Installations 2018 and BS 7671:2018+A2:2022

- 10.13 Poor housekeeping was observed in several caretaker managed areas, most notably within the ground-floor lobby, which contained a substantial volume of combustible material. Items included domestic style settees, decorative timber wall linings, framed paintings, soft furnishings, and various stored items. These materials introduce a significant and avoidable fire load into a space that should function as a sterile, fire resisting enclosure supporting safe evacuation. Varnished timber wall linings in particular are unlikely to meet current surface spread of flame requirements for circulation spaces, which under modern guidance should achieve at least Class B-s3, d2 to EN 13501-1. The presence of combustible finishes and furnishings in this area represents a clear deviation from expected fire safety standards. The responsible person should review these items to reduce fire loading and maintain the lobby as a protected and effective escape route.



OBSERVATIONS WITHIN FLATS

- 10.14 The building predominantly contains 2-bedroom flats, each fitted with a communal L2 fire alarm system extended into the flat, with the detector typically positioned above the flat entrance door. This location may delay the detection of a well-established fire, particularly where the fire originates in high-risk areas such as kitchens or living spaces. None of the flats inspected were fitted with an LD3 domestic alarm system and therefore lacked the dedicated smoke or heat detection typically expected in key risk rooms. Internal layouts varied across the building, with some flats configured in an open plan arrangement offering limited compartmentation and no doors separating higher risk rooms from escape routes.

Heating and hot water provisions also varied. While the original design provided electric underfloor heating, many residents had replaced this with electric panel heaters, and in one case, a wet central heating system supplied by an electric combination boiler. Most flats were still reliant on open vented immersion cylinders for hot water, many of which were served by cold water storage tanks located within the flats. Several of these tanks were observed to be in poor condition, lacking insulation and covers, which may pose a potential legionella risk.

Consumer units were also mixed, with many appearing to be original from the time of construction and showing signs of ageing components. This range of alterations and inconsistent standards across the flats reflects varying levels of maintenance and adaptation.

FIRE DETECTION AND ALARM SYSTEM

- 10.15 The Fire Alarm Panel (Control Indicating Equipment -CIE) is a Fike CIE-A-200 conforming to BS EN 54 (2&4) standard control indicating equipment. The signal is not sent to an alarm receiving centre (ARC). The residents or part time staff (if on site) will call the Fire and Rescue Service via 999.
- 10.16 The fire alarm system's automatic fire detectors, alarm and manual call points appear to be in line with the requirements of a BS 5839 Part 6 Grade A Category LD 2 / Grade D Category LD3 mixed system to support the simultaneous evacuation policy introduced circa 2017. It is noted that the common areas do not require a detection and alarm system and modern standards require a LD2 system as minimum in flats, however the alarm appears to be designed for the main purpose of simultaneous evacuation but no historical data or fire strategy was available to understand why the system was chosen.
- 10.17 Although common areas have no need for an alarm system in blocks of flats where they are built to support stay put policy, the decision was taken to fit one to support a simultaneous evacuation strategy however reliance on one smoke detector in large flats near the flat entrance/exit door is not to current standards but an improvement on many flats that had no detection prior to the installation circa 2017.
- 10.18 The system comprises the following components.
- 1- Manual call points in common areas (Corridors and near entrance also one in lift motor room to loft space)
 - 2- Smoke detection in common areas including one detector in lower ground floor car park
 - 3- Detectors in flats behind flat entrance door for activation of common alarm to whole premises.
 - 4- All electronic locks default to open on fire alarm signal
 - 5- The garage door in the lower ground floor does not open on activation of the fire alarm signal therefore only one exit is available in the lower ground floor car park. (Management should link it to the fire alarm or place a wicket door within, or an exit door to side, fit for emergency use.)
- 10.19 Testing is done every week and results recorded. CCTV is present and monitored by a private company who provide the caretaking staff-service. The onsite staff if present during working hours interrogate the fire alarm panel prior to investigation and call the fire and rescue service if required.
- 10.20 Fire Action Notices inform residents of what to do in a fire situation i.e. leave premises immediately by nearest fire exit if a fire is in their flat or they discover a fire in a common area or hear the fire alarm and call the Fire and Rescue Service.
- 10.21 Although common areas in most instances are not required to have fire detection and alarm it is unusual to have a BS 5839 Part 6 system in common areas, the following is an excerpt from the BS 5839 Part 6 standard (2013 version most likely if fitted pre-2017)

- 10.22 “Not included are hostels, caravans, boats (other than permanently moored) and communal parts of blocks of flats or maisonettes².”
- 10.23 It is recognised that the system would perform in a similar way and wiring, and control equipment is similar or of the same standard (such as fire rated pyro cable) but it is a deviation none the less and clarification from a competent person on this matter is advised as well as notifying your insurers for comment.
- 10.24 The latest BS 5839 part 1 –2025 was issued on April 29th, 2025, and management should ensure the new requirements are attained where necessary and if applicable.

EMERGENCY LIGHTING

- 10.25 Emergency lighting (BS5266) was noted in points of emphasis in residential corridors, staircases, and lift lobbies and outside final exits.
- 10.26 It was noted that no emergency escape lighting was present to the lower ground floor car park. This should be fitted by a competent electrical engineer to current British Standard 5266-1-2016 with sufficient units to afford safe egress in hours of darkness, should normal electrical supply fail during a fire.
- 10.27 Test reports have been provided to JIT for the emergency lighting in the building.
- 10.28 The Emergency Lighting is currently under a Section 20 Notice of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985 to replace the current system which does not have sufficient back up battery life. Management should take all reasonable steps to ensure this is done as soon as possible.
- 10.29 On site staff test monthly and have records on site.
- 10.30 JIT advise Management, under safety control, to operate the system in hours of darkness to evaluate if illumination is sufficient for safe egress from the premises³.

PEEP`S

- 10.31 Managing Estates Ltd provided a list of residents who need assistance but no individual Personal Emergency Evacuation Plans and no Secure Information Box with information for the FRS. Presently the residents of Flats 5,16 and 22 need assistance to evacuate. The Welsh Government have endorsed the findings of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry and will publish guidance on residential PEEP`s and Person-Centred Risk Assessments (PCRA) in the near future.

² BS 5839-6 2013 Fire detection and alarm systems in buildings. Code of practice for installation and servicing

³ BS 5266-1:2016 Code of practice for the emergency lighting of premises

EVACUATION STRATEGY

- 10.1 The evacuation strategy is simultaneous evacuation if the fire is in the flat or within any common areas. The management (if on site) assist with evacuation. Residents or staff will call 999.

11.0 ENGAGEMENT WITH RESIDENTS

- 11.1 Residents spoken to were aware of the simultaneous evacuation policy. Garth Court (Ltd) is a tenant owned company where all tenants are directors. Garth Court (Ltd) have appointed a management company (Managing Estates Ltd), to manage the premises including health and safety and fire safety matters.
- 11.2 Interactions with residents are by interaction with onsite staff and management, leaflets, as well as the maintenance staff visiting site. Other interactions include inspections by visiting Managing Estates Ltd staff, letters to residents, resident's handbook, emails and website. Residents spoken to were, on the whole well informed as to the fire safety measures and the management of complaints or queries. Most residents who engaged with the JIT during the internal inspections were very conscious of fire safety in high rise residential buildings and how to interact with the management with regard to fire safety concerns and how to report defects in regard to fire safety or voice concerns about fire safety procedure or equipment on site.
- 11.3 On the day of inspection residents spoke about known safety faults or fire related queries to Managing Estates Ltd who had their Managing Director accompanying the Joint Inspection Team during the inspection.

12.0 OBSERVATIONS: LIKELY FIRE SCENARIOS

FIRE SPREAD VIA SCAFFOLDING

- 12.1 The presence of scaffolding around the external facades of the building, could enable fire to spread from a flat to the flat above⁶.
- Difficulty accessing the dry riser due to it being accessed via the carpark which has a roller shutter for access.
- 12.2 No signage is provided to indicate the location of the dry riser inlet. The location of the dry riser inlet, at the middle of the under-croft carpark, is potentially hard to reach due to restricted access and the roller shutter door to the same not being activated upon the fire alarm activation. The location does not comply with the information in Approved Document B Volume 2 (Wales)

'Buildings fitted with fire mains 17.6 In the case of a building fitted with dry fire mains there should be access for a pumping appliance to within 18m of each fire main inlet connection point, typically on the face of the building. The inlet should be visible from the appliance.' page 183.

³ The potential impact of scaffolding on fire safety | CROSS IFE > News > Blog: Fire risk in buildings under construction and renovation
Questions raised over scaffolding's role in Dagenham blaze | Construction News

- 12.3 The riser inlet would not be visible from the fire appliance as there is a roller shutter that provides security to the carpark. This would then lead to hose laying distances over 18m to the riser inlet or cause a delay in augmenting the dry riser by crews having to overcome the roller shutter. In turn this will lead to fire crews needing additional time to set up before making an attack on a fire within the building.

FIRE IN THE ROOF VOIDS

- 12.4 JIT gained access to the roof void containing the lift motor room but were unable to access the roof void above the lower-level section of the building.

FIRE IN THE CARPARK SPREADING INTO THE BUILDING DUE TO POOR COMPARTMENTATION

- 12.5 During the inspection, breaches in compartmentation between the under-croft carpark and the building. A fire in the carpark could lead to smoke entering the building and eventually compromising areas within the means of escape.

FIRE IN A FLAT

- 12.6 The flats that were sampled during the inspection appeared to have LD3 detection with a smoke alarm in the hallway. The detector in each flat is located on the wall rather than the ceiling and is located just above the front entrance door. There is potential for a fire to develop, and a significant amount of smoke would need to enter the flat occupants escape route before they are alerted of the fire. Smoke alarms should be ceiling mounted so they are activated by the buoyant smoke and gases from a fire at the earliest point of entering that space.
- 12.7 Current guidance would require an LD2 alarm, meaning ceiling mounted smoke detection in the flat hallway, the principal habitable room and a heat detector in the kitchen. As an interim measure it is recommended that North Wales Fire & Rescue Service complete Safe & Well visits to each flat in the building and provide detection mounted on the ceiling of the hallways.
- 12.8 Longer term, it is recommended that the individual flat owners upgrade their detection to an LD2 standard. This will provide earlier warning to residents and improve their safety.

13.0 REVIEW OF FIRE RISK ASSESSMENT (FRA)

THE FIRE RISK ASSESSMENT

- 13.1 The Fire Risk Assessment (FRA) was a Type 1 for common areas only, undertaken by Andrew Parry for Snowdonia Fire Protection on April 13th, 2023.
- 13.2 The assessment produced an action plan, and the overall rating for the assessment was given as Tolerable risk (However the assessment incorporated the separate detached 4 storey building in the assessment which may have influenced the rating).
- 13.3 The action plan points were:
- 1- Regular review of FRA i.e. periodic 12 months or incident/alterations/building work.
 - 2- No EICR present for inspection.
 - 3- Fire alarm to be tested 6 monthly in accordance with British Standard 5839.
 - 4- Check Fire Doors and Maintain accordingly (Record 6 monthly checks)
- 13.4 Since the date of the action plan, it was noted:
- 1- (There is no documentary evidence of review, or records of such a review)
 - 2- EICR certificate provided stated unsatisfactory with 21 C2/C3 recommendations, no remediation certificate to say work was carried out to rectify.
 - 3- BS Test certificates for fire detection and alarm system provided.
 - 4- No records of maintenance of fire doors.
- 13.5 The assessment also made reference to PAS 79 (2007) which has been superseded in 2012/2020 (part 1 and 2). It also cites the responsible person as the Chair of Owners when a management company has been the designated responsible person since 2022.
- 13.6 The assessment makes no reference to the external wall make up or the mansard roof. The Assessment also makes reference to the second building being 4 stories high when in fact, that building is five stories high.
- 13.7 The assessment mentions making use of a refuge area but there are no refuges on site. The assessment assumes all people can self-evacuate. 3 persons may need assistance to evacuate. The mentions a hot work permit but no reference to a management hot work policy with proof of supporting documentation.
- 13.8 It makes no reference to combustible wall linings within the ground-floor main entrance, nor the combustible furniture present.

- 13.9 The FRA assessment makes no reference to the compartmentation breaches observed (which appear to be legacy issues, (i.e. are not new).
- 13.10 No mention of the potential storage of Electric Vehicles in the lower ground floor car park which has non-compliant fire stopping and holes to voids within.
- 13.11 The assessment does not recommend Fire Extinguisher removal, therefore allowing residents to potentially stay and fight a fire instead of complying with the simultaneous evacuation policy.

Issues arising from the FRA include:

- No mention of Fireman's lift, nor the testing of the lift
- No mention of PEEP's being potentially required or in force
- No mention of Dry riser service and maintenance

Overall, the JIT does not support the Tolerable rating of the assessment

THE FIRE STRATEGY


- 13.12 There was no fire strategy document or provenance data provided at the time of report preparation.

PART THREE: CONCLUSIONS

14.0 WORKS RECOMMENDED TO REDUCE FIRE RISK

WORKS RECOMMENDED – EXTERNAL

- 14.1 The presence of scaffolding around the external facades of the building could enable fire to spread from a flat to the flat above, or horizontally across fire compartment lines.
- The JIT recommend that all scaffolding structures be removed at the earliest opportunity once works have concluded around the building.
- 14.2 The waste bins were stored externally along the north elevation of the building in an area that is open and accessible to the public. While the space is covered by CCTV surveillance, its open nature presents a potential risk of arson, deliberate interference, or vandalism. The presence of combustible refuse in an unsecured area adjacent to the building increases exposure, particularly given the potential for ignition sources and the proximity to the final exit at the foot of the protected staircase.
- The JIT recommend that the bin waste storage arrangement should be reviewed to determine whether additional physical security measures or enclosure would be appropriate to reduce the risk.
- 14.3 The lower ground floor car park had a concrete staircase at the side of the main entrance, with an alternative escape via a roller-shutter garage door. The garage door is normally closed therefore only one escape route is available. Travel distances would exceed 18m for a single direction. There was no emergency lighting present within the lower ground floor car park. There was no emergency escape signage BS -EN ISO 7010 (Running man signage) in the lower ground floor car park.
- The garage door should have a wicket gate within, or an alternative final exit door fitted nearby.
 - There was no emergency escape lighting in the lower ground floor car park. This should be fitted by a competent engineer to places of emphasis and near final exits.
 - Emergency escape signage BS -EN ISO 7010 (Running man signage) should be fitted within the lower ground level car park, so that if someone turns their back on one escape sign, another sign to the alternative exit is visible. We advise illuminated signage for this area.
- 14.4 The firefighting dry riser was in poor condition and had no recorded maintenance or testing undertaken at the time of inspection. The dry riser external housing was in poor condition and poorly located.
- The JIT recommend that the management engage a competent person to undertake maintenance and testing of the dry riser system in compliance with Article 17 of the 2005 Fire Safety Order and the recommendations of BS9990, including installing appropriate signage.
 - Regular maintenance and testing should be undertaken to ensure the system remains fully operational and ready for use by fire service crews.



14.5 No lightning protection system was observed during the inspection at Garth Court. The building is a high-rise residential block with a combination of combustible and conductive materials at roof level, increasing its vulnerability to lightning strikes.

- The JIT recommend that a formal risk assessment In line with BS EN 62305-2:2012 should be undertaken to determine whether protection is required. Given the height, occupancy, and construction of the building, it is likely that protection measures would be recommended and should be addressed by the responsible person.

14.6 Concrete spalling and exposed corroded reinforcement were observed, primarily within the lower ground floor level car park areas.

- The JIT recommend that a structural survey is undertaken by a competent engineer to establish extent and remediation treatments.
- Ongoing routine maintenance should be undertaken out to arrest such defects at an early stage moving forward.

14.7 There were exposed heavy electrical cables fitted to the edge of the lower soffit of the car park at <2.0m in height. This poses a risk of a car roof striking these high voltage cables.

- The JIT recommend that these cables are either moved to a location where the risk of impact is lower or that the cables are enclosed within a robust and secure trunking system and appropriate signage is provided to the area where the car park soffit height changes.

14.8 There were drainage pipes and soil stacks running through the soffits above the lower ground level car park which lacked fire collars at the soffit, leaving openings that compromise vertical compartmentation.

COMPARTMENTATION

- 14.9 A number of compartmentation breaches and non-compliant fire stopping was identified during the inspection in the common parts service riser cupboards, within the former waste chute room and to the lower-level car park soffits, (See compartmentation table within Appendix Three).
- The JIT recommends that the Council engage a competent contractor to undertake a compartmentation survey of the common parts of the building between floor levels. Carry out any works identified in the compartmentation survey as being necessary to ensure the relevant levels of compartmentation are provided and ensure that all points highlighted in Appendix Three have been addressed.
 - Include areas in service risers within common areas, plant rooms, within corridors, within the historic bin waste chute, the soffit of the lower ground floor car park, and other areas where smoke could travel into escape routes.
 - The compartmentation survey is to be conducted by a competent person, such as a chartered engineer registered with the UK Engineering Council by the Institution of Fire Engineers, or someone with relevant knowledge and experience or an accredited third-party organisation versed in compartmentation standards and remediation work.
 - A full copy of the survey report should be provided to the NWFRS Authority, until fully remediated.
- 14.10 The Emergency Lighting is currently under a Section 20 Notice process, of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985, to replace the current system which does not have sufficient back up battery life.
- Management should take all reasonable steps to ensure this is completed as soon as possible.
 - The JIT recommend that the building Management, under safety control, to operate the system in hours of darkness to evaluate if illumination is sufficient for safe egress from the premises.

WORKS RECOMMENDED – INTERNAL

- 14.11 There was poorly located smoke detection within flats and a lack of internal AFD within Flats
- It is advised that all flats meet LD2 standard for detection as a minimum and the top 2 habitable floors i.e. levels 7/8 and 4/5, LD1 (as mansard roof is potentially combustible). This will ensure that early warning is given for escape for residents.

- 14.12 Many flat entrance doors were not current BS 476 fire doors or had no automatic self-closing device fitted. Some doors were notional fire doors in common areas, and some areas were not protected by fire doors such as service riser rooms, personal demise cupboards within means of escape corridors and ground floor to caretakers' room and store. The Fire Risk Assessment alluded to this in 2023 but there was no evidence that actions were carried out.
- The JIT recommends that the managing agents have a competent person undertake a fire door survey and complete works to improve, repair or replace as needed; damaged common parts fire doors to protected staircases and corridors, including, but not limited to ironmongery (e.g. hinges), door furniture, magnetic locks and hold-open / self-closing devices.
- 14.13 The main entrance had furniture and wooden wall linings to the ground floor entrance and foyer. The settee had no markings to say it complied with the Furniture and Furnishings (Fire) (Safety) Regulations 1988(Amended 2025 deferred till October 25) or BS 7176: 2007 and BS 7177: 2008– Up holstered furniture and mattresses.
- It is advised a new Fire Risk Assessment for the premises is done by a competent person who can assess the risk of furniture and combustible wall linings and make recommendations as part of the assessment. The wall linings are not fire resistant (And do not comply with ADB Vol2 Wales and present a significant fire load, as does the settee).
 - As an interim control measure, the JIT recommend that the settee is removed from the premises.
- 14.14 There was a single detector within the lift motor room, mansard loft void and no AFD present within its anteroom. The lower ground floor car park is reliant on one smoke detector present to the high-level soffit.
- The JIT recommend that the management employ a competent engineer to extend the fire alarm and detection system within the following areas:
1. The lift motor room
 2. The mansard roof area, loft void
 3. The lift motor room, anteroom
 4. The lower ground car park
- 14.15 There were no PEEPs present for the Garth Court Building.
- PEEP's should be produced and kept in a secure information box within the main ground floor entrance, for use by the Fire and Rescue Service.

- 14.16 There was no Secure Information Box (SIB) present within the Garth Court building.
- The JIT recommend that the building Management install a SIB in a prominent location within the ground floor of the Garth Court building and ensure that the SIB contains relevant building fire safety and PEEP information, to be available to the NWFRS at all material times.
- 14.17 There was no sprinkler system present within the Garth Court building.
- The JIT advocates retro fitting BS 9251 sprinkler systems to High-Risk Buildings (Over 18m or 7 storeys).
- 14.18 Smoke control, OV's (Opening Vents, i.e. windows), were present on longer corridors between blocks but without a coherent smoke control system to support the same.
- The JIT recommends – FRA review should include suitability considerations for the existing smoke control system.
- 14.19 The Fire Risk Assessment provided for the building did not appear to meet the test of being suitable and sufficient. Additionally, there were a number of outstanding findings remaining since the prior date of assessment.
- The JIT recommends that the management engage a competent person to undertake a suitable and sufficient Fire Risk Assessment (FRA), record the findings and act upon the same.
- 14.20 Emergency escape signage was omitted at landing lobby doors to a number of floor levels.
- The management should have a competent person review the wayfinding and escape signage and install adequate escape signage on all floor level, landing lobby doors.
- 14.21 There were decommissioned fire hose reels still present within all dry riser cupboards to each floor level.
- The JIT recommend that all unused hose reels are removed from site and disposed of in the appropriate manner.
- 14.22 The JIT had no sight of an EV policy for the Garth Court building covered car park.
- The JIT recommend that the management refer to further guidance on Electric Vehicle (EV) parking as below:

The Office for Zero Emission Vehicles (OZEV) guidance, T0194 – provides car park fire safety guidance for electric vehicles. This is interim guidance to support parking and / or charging of electric vehicles and the installation of electric vehicle charge points in covered car parks. This guidance document outlines mitigation measures which should be considered by a competent person to reduce the impact of an EV fire. These are outlined using the ERIC (eliminate, reduce, isolate, control) model. These considerations include, but are not limited to:

- Suppression systems

- Increased structural fire resistances
- Distance between parked cars
- Firefighting water supplies
- Water run-off control and containment
- Locations and features of EV charge points
- Enhanced smoke management systems
- Thermal imaging cameras and other early detection methods, to enable early intervention
- Retrofitting existing covered car parks for the provision of EVs/EVCPs.
- Designing new covered car parks for the provision of EVs/EVCPs.

The JIT further recommends the following actions:

- That the managing agent develops an interim EV parking strategy to ensure EV's are positioned and parked in the open air, away from the fabric of the residential building.
- When considering the future growth of EV parking, the JIT advised that a Fire Risk Assessment is reviewed to establish mitigation measures, prior to installing the charge points - to assess the impact these have on existing fire safety measures; and identify significant, increased risks that may result from the increased numbers of EVs and/or EVCPs within the covered car park. Given the complexity and potential considerations/measures that may be needed, a competent person with sufficient experience who understands fire safety approaches in car parks should be appointed to undertake the fire risk assessment.
- It is recommended by the JIT that a sprinkler system be installed throughout the covered areas of the lower-level car park, in compliance with BS EN 12845:2015+A1:2019 Fixed firefighting systems. Automatic sprinkler systems. Design, installation and maintenance.

14.23 The JIT had no sight of a degraded systems policy for the Garth Court building.

- The JIT recommends that the management develop Fire Risk Management Systems in line with BS 9997-2019.

15.0 (HHSRS) HAZARD ASSESSMENT, RATING & RELATED MATTERS

15.1 The inspection and Housing Health and Safety Rating System (HHSRS) scoring identified multiple fire safety concerns that initially reflected a Category 2, Fire hazard at the Garth Court building.

15.2 The hazard band rating was a Band D, Category 2 Fire Hazard. Therefore, discretion lies with the Local Authority to determine the most appropriate course of action in relation to reducing this hazard. For context, a Band D category 2 hazard rating reflects a moderate to significant risk of harm posed to occupiers of the building, within the coming 12 months.

- 15.3 Due to the collaborative-first approach adopted by the JIT, a short period of time was provided for voluntary remedial actions to be undertaken to reduce the Fire hazard to a lower level.

POST-INSPECTION REMEDIAL WORKS CARRIED OUT TO REDUCE FIRE HAZARD, UNDERTAKEN VOLUNTARILY

- 15.4 At the time of preparing this report, no remedial works were confirmed to have been carried out to reduce the fire hazard present. As a result, the Band D, Category 2 Fire Hazard rating remains as-is.

16.0 NON-FIRE RELATED HAZARDS

- 16.1 The inspection identified no significant deficiencies which would alter either the likelihood of an occurrence or the harm outcomes, relating to other hazards outside of the Fire hazard.

17.0 GOVERNMENT GUIDANCE

- 17.1 DHCLG, 2018, HHSRS Addendum for the profile for the hazard of fire and in relation to cladding systems on high rise residential buildings, Guidance under section 9 of The Housing Act 2004.
- 17.2 ODPM, 2006, Operating Guidance to support the HHSRS
- 17.3 DCLG, 2006, A Guide to Fire Safety Risk Assessments in Sleeping Accommodation.
- 17.4 Home Office, A Guide to Fire Safety in purpose-built blocks of flats (draft guidance) 2023.

Signed



Date - August 2025

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Date - August 2025

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Date - August 2025

Kyle Higgins
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Signed



Date - August 2025

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Signed



Inspector Date - August 2025

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX ONE: HHSRS ASSESSMENT, HAZARD RATING & JUSTIFICATION

PROPERTY DETAILS	Garth Court, Abbey Road, Llandudno, LL30 2HF
Date of Inspection	17/06/2025 – 19/06/2025
Property Identification	Garth Court, Abbey Road, Llandudno, LL30 2HF
Property Age Band	1946- 1979 (circa 1970's)
Property Type	Common parts and sample of flats of high-rise residential building

Note: No intrusive investigations, examinations or surveys have been undertaken during this inspection.
The following reports have been referenced as primary sources in this HHSRS assessment:
The Fire Risk Assessment undertaken by Snowdonia Fire Protection dated, April 2023.

PROPERTY DESCRIPTION

The building was constructed around the 1970's.

The tallest part of the building was 9 storeys high. The building was estimated to be >25 Metres in height from 9th (uppermost residential) finished-floor level to the lowest outside ground level.

There were front and side access doors leading into the ground floor reception area, and the protected staircase was located to the rear of the ground floor reception.

TERMINOLOGY

Floor levels are referenced according to the designations indicated by the display in the ground floor reception lobby and on each communal landing area leading to the lifts and to the protected staircase.

Elevations are named by their cardinal directions unless otherwise indicated i.e. the front façade of the building is taken as if facing the principal (front) elevation, which faces approximately Southwest.

The terms 'apartment' and 'flat' are used interchangeably throughout this report.

VISUAL OBSERVATIONS BY JOINT INSPECTION TEAM

EXTERNAL FACADES



- o A visual examination of the block and of available documents established the external elements of the building consisted of:
- o Masonry 65%
- o Glazing with uPVC frames (estimated at 20%)
- o Flat roofing and wall systems (estimated at 15%)

EXTERNAL WALL SYSTEM

- o Garth Court is constructed using a reinforced concrete structural frame, forming the primary load bearing framework. The external walls were originally built with a brick outer leaf, a cavity, and a masonry inner leaf, tied to the concrete frame.
- o Glazed areas with uPVC frames appeared to consist of glass and plastic components.

BALCONIES

- o There were no external balconies present at the Garth Court building.

WINDOWS AND OTHER PENETRATIONS

- o All windows to flats had uPVC framework.
- o There was a Mansard roof forming the wall system of the uppermost floor. There were no other substantive wall penetrations.

ELECTRICAL IGNITION SOURCES



- o Within the protected corridors there were electric meter housings present.
- o Within the lower ground floor level car park there were high voltage cables mounted on the outer edge of a low-height soffit which is at risk of impact from moving vehicles at <2.0m in height.

OTHER EXTERNAL OBSERVATIONS

- o The dry rising main inlet was located within the lower ground level car park which had poor access. The water supply hydrant for this being 15 metres from the same.
- o The residential, main entrance door was monitored by CCTV, each apartment is provided with key-fob access and a door entry-call system from outside the building.
- o Access to car parking is provided both underneath the building footprint and within the grounds of the blocks more than 15 metres distant from all elevations of the building.
- o There was approximately 50% fire service vehicle access around the building perimeter.

OBSERVATIONS – INTERNAL

COMPARTMENTATION

- o A visual examination of the building's interior indicates that the primary structure is composed of reinforced concrete with support beams and columns, consistent with the construction methods suggested by the external observations.
- o Internal walls within the residential units and common areas appeared to be constructed using masonry materials and stud wall partitions along corridors in parts.
- o The service riser cupboard was observed to ascend the full height of the residential building, housing electrical, plumbing, and telecoms systems. The integrity of fire-stopping measures within these risers appeared to be poor with breaches on each floor level requiring remedial action.

MEANS OF ESCAPE

- o The building is equipped with a single protected staircase serving all floors, constructed of concrete, likely to be of 60 minutes fire resistance. This stairwell functions as the sole protected escape route. The final exit discharges to the outside rear of the building.
- o There is an exit to the front and left side of the building from within the ground floor reception lobby.

FIRE SIGNAGE

- o Directional emergency exit signs were missing from a number of landing lobbies and corridors leading to the staircase. Wayfinding and escape signage was also omitted within the lower ground floor level car park.

FIRE DOORS

- o Fire doors were installed at various locations, including entry points to landings from the stairwell, between corridors and flat entrances. The majority of fire doors inspected were notional fire doors at best, some with self-closer devices missing.
- o Doors to service riser cupboards on each floor, adjacent to the lift core were constructed of non-fire-resistant materials.

SMOKE CONTROL SYSTEM

- o There was no automatic smoke control system within the building however the MOE stairs were open sided in terms of ventilation on all floors which would prevent smoke build up.
- o Manual opening vents were provided in the form of corridor windows along some of the long corridors joining the two blocks together.

FIRE SUPPRESSION SYSTEM

- o There were no sprinklers fitted within the building. At time of the construction, there was no requirement for sprinklers to be installed in a building of this height.
- o The location, poor condition and lack of recorded maintenance of the dry riser main was a concern at the time of inspection.
- o There were decommissioned fire hose reels within the dry rising main cupboards on each floor level.

FIRE ALARM & DETECTION SYSTEM

- o A domestic fire warning system was fitted in most, but not all, flats inspected. The provision of alarms seemed consistent with a Grade D1, of category LD3 design (at best). A small number of flats were seen to have no detection other than the communal fire alarm system detector.
- o There was a communal fire alarm system with sounders present within the building, in support of the simultaneous evacuation policy

EMERGENCY LIGHTING

- o Emergency lighting was provided to all internal areas and above external doors but was omitted from the lower ground floor level car park. The back up batteries had failed to provide more than 75 minutes of emergency power during a recent draw-down test.

LIFTS

- o There was a single fireman's lift serving all floors within the landing corridors. This was fully operational at the time of inspection but there was little recorded maintenance for the same.

OBSERVATIONS - LIKELY FIRE SCENARIOS

REASONABLY FORESEEABLE SCENARIOS:

FIRE SPREAD VIA SCAFFOLDING

- o The presence of scaffolding around the external facades of the building, could enable fire to spread from a flat to the flat above*.

Difficulty accessing the dry riser due to it being accessed via the carpark which has a roller shutter for access.

- o No signage is provided to indicate the location of the dry riser inlet. The location of the dry riser inlet, at the middle of the under-croft carpark, is potentially hard to reach due to restricted access and the roller shutter door to the same not being activated upon the fire alarm activation. The location does not comply with the information in Approved Document B Volume 2 (Wales)

'Buildings fitted with fire mains 17.6 In the case of a building fitted with dry fire mains there should be access for a pumping appliance to within 18m of each fire main inlet connection point, typically on the face of the building. The inlet should be visible from the appliance.' page 183.

- o The riser inlet would not be visible from the fire appliance as there is a roller shutter that provides security to the carpark. This would then lead to hose laying distances over 18m to the riser inlet or cause a delay in augmenting the dry riser by crews having to overcome the roller shutter. In turn this will lead to fire crews needing additional time to set up before making an attack on a fire within the building.

FIRE IN THE ROOF VOIDS

- o JIT gained access to the roof void containing the lift motor room but were unable to access the roof void above the lower-level section of the building.

FIRE IN THE CARPARK SPREADING INTO THE BUILDING DUE TO POOR COMPARTMENTATION

- o During the inspection, breaches in compartmentation between the under-croft carpark and the building. A fire in the carpark could lead to smoke entering the building and eventually compromising areas within the means of escape.

* The potential impact of scaffolding on fire safety | CROSS IFE > News > Blog: Fire risk in buildings under construction and renovation
Questions raised over scaffolding's role in Dagenham blaze | Construction News

FIRE IN A FLAT

- o The flats that were sampled during the inspection appeared to have LD3 detection with a smoke alarm in the hallway. The detector in each flat is located on the wall rather than the ceiling and is located just above the front entrance door. There is potential for a fire to develop, and a significant amount of smoke would need to enter the flat occupants escape route before they are alerted of the fire. Smoke alarms should be ceiling mounted so they are activated by the buoyant smoke and gases from a fire at the earliest point of entering that space.
- o Current guidance would require an LD2 alarm, meaning ceiling mounted smoke detection in the flat hallway, the principal habitable room and a heat detector in the kitchen. As an interim measure it is recommended that North Wales Fire & Rescue Service complete Safe & Well visits to each flat in the building and provide detection mounted on the ceiling of the hallways.
- o Longer term, it is recommended that the individual flat owners upgrade their detection to an LD2 standard. This will provide earlier warning to residents and improve their safety.

LIST OF RELEVANT MATTERS

Likelihood		Outcomes	
Presence of combustible cladding	2	Presence of combustible cladding	2
Lack of suitable and sufficient FRA	2	Non-fire-resistant doors/sets to flat(s), door closers, poorly fitting doors etc.	3
Outstanding points from FRA	2	Lack of/non-functioning AFD within flats	2
Lack of/non-functioning AFD within flats	2	Lack of/non-functioning communal AFD	1
Lack of/non-functioning communal AFD	1	Non-functioning or poorly managed Smoke Control system inc. servicing / testing	2
Lack of/poorly designed/poorly maintained sprinkler system	1	Non-fire-resistant fabric/enclosure of services	2
Non-functioning/poorly designed/poorly managed smoke control system and/or no record of weekly testing	1	Disrepair to doors forming route of escape to a place of safety including sanctuary for disabled persons	3
Disrepair to outer surfaces	1	Single route of escape to a place of safety or issues with availability of alternative escape routes	-
Disrepair to fabric and compromising of compartmentation	1	Narrow route of escape to place of safety	1
Services and ducting affecting compartmentation	3	Obstructions to the route of escape, such as mobility scooters, prams/pushchairs	2
Services not in fire resistant enclosure	2	Absence of test certificate for fire lift (if present)	3
Absence or inadequate record of dry riser	3	Absence of, or disrepair to emergency lighting (monthly testing)	3
Non-fire-resistant, damaged, or badly maintained doors in or opening onto common parts	3	Absence of or inadequate record for dry riser (or wet riser if building over 50m	3
Non-fire-resistant waste hoppers / Disrepair to refuse chute hopper	2	Lack of suitable access to building for firefighters	1

Internal or external sources of fuel etc.	2	Absence of fire suppressant or sprinkler system	1
Inadequate waste storage	2	Refuse chute hopper (location)	2
Opportunity for external intentional fire	2	Refuse chute hopper (condition)	2
External unintentional fire	2	Inadequate external lighting	-
Lack of controlled access/security	2	Signage	2
Lightning protection system	1	Distance between buildings and safety	-
Issues with building design	1	Issues with building design e.g. inadequate safe MOE, inability to exit the building from all exit doors, lobbies, increased fire loading in common parts – fire loading and obstruction of MOE	2
Electrical fire hazards	2	Site specific issues in flats not identified above multiple cooking appliances, within rooms; when occupation begins. Fire drills are undertaken only at low % occupant capacity	-
Complexity of building, mixed/commercial use, car parks, attached or nearby buildings (sheds)	2	Site specific issues in common parts not identified above	-
Site specific issues with common parts not identified above – (scaffolding in place for 2 years+ hose reels not removed from riser cupboard)	2		
Site specific issues in flats not identified above	-		

Key:
 3 Seriously defective

 2 Defective

 1 Not satisfactory

- Satisfactory

Housing Health and Safety Rating System Scoring (post inspection)

Likelihood

Likelihood = 1 in 180

National Average = 1 in 2,157

5600	3200	1800	1000	560	320	180	100	56	32	18	10	6	3	2	1
<4200	2400	1300	750	420	240	130	75	42	24	13	7.5	4	2.5	1.5	>

LIKELIHOOD JUSTIFICATION:

- External Façades: The materials used in the external façades were confirmed to be non-combustible to the majority of walls except to the mansard roof on the uppermost floor level.
- The mansard roof forms the walls for the upper residential floor (8th) with plant room areas within.

The materials insulating the exterior and interior of the wall build-up were flammable and may cause medium fire to spread, across compartment lines on the 8th floor and lower-level block, where the Mansard roofs were present.

- There were no balconies present however there was scaffolding with timber walking boards present to large areas of the lower block.
- Fire-Stopping and Compartmentation: There was a lack of complete fire-stopping within service risers, within the redundant bin chute waste collection room and to the lower-level car park soffits.
- Automatic fire detection within flats:
- Variable coverage within the owner-occupied flats throughout. LD3 at best, with L2 coverage within hall of flats. Inappropriate location of detector siting in parts, e.g. fixed to walls in flats.
- Common parts Automatic fire detection:
- The system was broadly designed to BS5839-6:2019, within common parts with some deviations from the standard in parts
- Smoke control, no AOVS present on longer corridors between blocks
- No sprinkler system provided
- Fire loading and poor housekeeping to:

- service cupboards
- lift motor room
- caretaker's office
- Ground floor main entrance fire loading, soft furnishings without fire retardant labelling present
- Opportunity for arson, main bin storage area. Large waste bins unsecured
- Lightning protection, unseen and no service records provided
- Electrical fire ignition:
- EICR unsatisfactory dated 2023 - C2 & C3 faults recorded with no evidence of rectification
- Fuse boards located on each floor level along the MOE
- No PAT testing records provided
- Vulnerable electrical intake cabling not protected at a change of soffit height within the lower ground floor car park, presents a risk of significant damage from moving vehicles at <2.0m in height
- Compartmentation:
- Service risers have multiple vertical penetrations to each floor. The doors to service riser rooms were non-fire resistant on all floor levels
- Flat doors and doors opening onto protected MOE were uncertified doors in parts, with inappropriate and missing self-closing devices
- Decommissioned bin chute, not adequately fire stopped
- Car park soffit/into the Ground floor compartment, 7 drainage stacks + 1 hole not fire stopped or protected with intumescent collars
- damage to blocks forming the soffit above the car park had disrepair/damage and gaps in parts, aggravated by water penetration
- Firefighting facilities:
- Dry rising main, no evidence of testing/servicing provided
- Decommissioned fire hose reels still present within dry riser cupboards to all floor levels
- No EV policy provided

For all the above reasons (when considered holistically) the likelihood of a fire that could cause harm has been increased above national averages.

HARM OUTCOMES

Class I	0	0.1	0.2	0.5	1	2.2	4.6	10	21.5	31.6	46.4
Class II	0	0.1	0.2	0.5	1	2.2	4.6	10	21.5	31.6	46.4
Class III	0	0.1	0.2	0.5	1	2.2	4.6	10	21.5	31.6	46.4
Class IV	0	0.1	0.2	0.5	1	2.2	4.6	10	21.5	31.6	46.4

<0.05 0.15 0.3 0.7 1.5 3 7 15 26 38>

JUSTIFICATION:

The additional mental health and wellbeing harms highlighted by Grenfell and the increased potential for non-fatal injuries and exposure to fumes, justify increases in Class 2 and 3 harms.

The following matters justify a further increase in Class 1, 2 and 3 harms:

- **External Façades:** The materials used in the external façades were confirmed to be non-combustible to the majority of walls except to the mansard roof on the uppermost floor level.
- The mansard roof forms the walls for the upper residential floor (8th) with plant room areas within. The materials insulating the exterior and interior of the wall build-up were flammable and may cause medium fire to spread, across compartment lines on the 8th floor and lower-level block, where the Mansard roofs were present.
- There were no balconies present however there was scaffolding with timber walking boards present to large areas of the lower block.
- **Fire-Stopping and Compartmentation:** There was a lack of complete fire-stopping within service risers, within the redundant bin chute waste collection room and to the lower-level car park soffits.
- **Automatic fire detection within flats:**
- Variable coverage within the owner-occupied flats throughout. LD3 at best, with L2 coverage within hall of flats. Inappropriate location of detector siting in parts, e.g. fixed to walls in flats.
- **Common parts Automatic fire detection:**
- The system was broadly designed to BS5839-6:2019, within common parts with some deviations from the standard in parts
- Smoke control, no AOVs present on longer corridors between blocks
- No sprinkler system provided

- Fire loading and poor housekeeping to:
- service cupboards
- lift motor room
- caretaker's office
- Ground floor main entrance fire loading, soft furnishings without fire retardant labelling present
- Opportunity for arson, main bin storage area. Large waste bins unsecured
- Lightning protection, unseen and no service records provided
- Electrical fire ignition:
- EICR unsatisfactory dated 2023 - C2 & C3 faults recorded with no evidence of rectification
- Fuse boards located on each floor level along the MOE
- No PAT testing records provided
- Vulnerable electrical intake cabling not protected at a change of soffit height within the lower ground floor car park, presents a risk of significant damage from moving vehicles at <2.0m in height
- Compartmentation:
- Service risers have multiple vertical penetrations to each floor. The doors to service riser rooms were non-fire resistant on all floor levels
- Flat doors and doors opening onto protected MOE were uncertified doors in parts, with inappropriate and missing self-closing devices
- Decommissioned bin chute, not adequately fire stopped
- Car park soffit/into the Ground floor compartment, 7 drainage stacks + 1 hole not fire stopped or protected with intumescent collars
- damage to blocks forming the soffit above the car park had disrepair/damage and gaps in parts, aggravated by water penetration
- MOE stairs 780mm wide, may affect firefighting operational access
- Emergency escape signage omitted at landing lobby doors to a number of floor levels
- Emergency lighting, backup power supply batteries were only providing 75 mins lighting duration - this should be no less than 3 hours duration

- Firefighting facilities:
- The Fireman's lift had no LOLER certification or evidence of testing/servicing provided
- Dry rising main, no evidence of testing/servicing provided
- Decommissioned fire hose reels still present within dry riser cupboards to all floor levels
- Fire extinguishers were present within protected corridors, this does not support the simultaneous evacuation strategy

When considering the above matters, the Class 1, 2 and 3 spread of harm outcomes have each been increased to reflect the holistic impact of the same to the severity of harms posed within the building.

RATING SCORE: 649, CATEGORY 2 HAZARD, BAND D

A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J
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APPENDIX TWO: INTELLIGENCE ACQUIRED

Garth Court Compliance information at the time of report preparation

Item	Dates	Comments
Lifts -insurance LOLER 1998	No documentation available	Lifting Operations and Lifting Equipment Regs 1998
Lifts -Service (Mechanical)	16/06/2025	BS 7255
Firemans lift (Pre 1986)	Firemans lift (Controls operated by JIT)	BS EN 81-72:2015 BS 8899-2016
Emergency Lights-Annual	Subject to Sec 20 Housing Act 2004	BS 5266-1-2016
Refuse Chute fire shutter and deep clean	Redundant (See compartmentation table)	BS 1703 BS 476-part 22
Fire Strategy Document O&M /Reg 38 info	Not available-some info for Mansard repair	Handover from developer
Sprinklers (if applicable)	No sprinklers present	BS 9251
Fire Door Survey/Maintenance (Common area)	Not available	Art 17 RR(FS)O 2005
Fire Alarm System (6 monthly)	11/03/2025	BS 5839 Part 1 / 6
AOV (Smoke shafts)	Permanent vents to staircase, no smoke shafts present	BS EN 12101-2
Emergency Lights Monthly Test	6/06/2025	BS 5266-1-2016
Fire Alarm Weekly Test	Weekly -Friday by Caretaker	Site Fire Logbook
Fire Risk Assessment	Last one available 13/04/2023	Annual review / 3 year renew (Minimum)
Health and Safety Assessment	Not available	HASAWA/MHSAWR
Dry Riser -6m visual -12 m Annual pressure	Not carried out-NWFRS informed	BS 9990-2015
Evacuation drill	No records	Site Fire Logbook

EICR -Electrical Installation Condition Report	8/5/2023-Unsatisfactory (16 C2 & 5 C3). No remediation report available.	BS 7671 +A2:2022 18 th Edition IET Wiring regs.
PAT testing	Not available.	Electricity at Work Regulations 1989
O&M Manual/data/drawings	No provenance data available	Reg 38
Legionella Risk Assessment	Not available. Tank analysis document 23/5/2023	HSG274 ACoP L8 HASAW act 1974 COSHH 2002
FRAEW/EWS1/Façade analysis	No EWS 1 undertaken.	External wall survey (FRAEW). PAS 9980
Lightning Protection	None present (No risk assessment done)	BS EN 62305 Part1-4
Fire Dampers (Fusible link)	None present	BS- EN 1366-2 BESA DW145
Asbestos Management Survey	5/9/2022	CAR 2012/HSG 264
Personal Emergency Evacuation Plans (PEEP`s)	List of residents who need assistance, but no PEEP`s	Simultaneous Evacuation policy
Structural Survey (Periodic 5 yearly) / Condition Survey	Defects survey 22/09/2023 but no structural survey.	Building Safety Act 2022- Recommendation

APPENDIX THREE: FIRE DOORS AND COMPARTMENTATION

Garth Court, Llandudno- Compartmentation breaches* and / or further investigation identified for non-compliant issues observed such as faults with active fire precaution systems, fire loading or other relevant observations.

*Breaches that would allow smoke, heat and fire travel into or within building.

Location	Compartmentation Compliance Standard or fault/deviation noted	Further Investigation warranted	Suggested action or remedy for consideration
Lower Ground floor car park- partially enclosed but vented.	<i>Breaches in ceiling(holes) Spalling concrete renders holes to clay hollow blocks. No intumescent collars to soil pipes to voids/upper floors</i>	Yes - (Compartmentation Survey)	Fire stop using an appropriate method to ASFP/ADB guidance. Use BS 476 fire rated intumescent collars for soil pipe runs.
Lower Ground floor car park- partially enclosed but vented.	Dry riser inlet box in very poor condition and would allow smoke, heat and fire travel into riser.	Yes	Renew
Lower Ground floor car park- partially enclosed but vented.	<i>Insufficient Emergency Escape signage to both exits</i>	Yes	Install <i>Emergency Escape signage (Running Man)</i> to BS 5499/ISO7010. <i>Consider illuminated signage</i>
Lower Ground floor car park- partially enclosed but vented.	Combustibles belonging to Tenants are within lower ground floor car park area	Yes	Combustibles should be removed or placed in a 60m fire resistant structure.
Lower Ground floor car park- partially enclosed but vented.	No Emergency Escape Lighting to car park	Yes	Install <i>Emergency Escape Lighting BS 5266-1:2016 to points of emphasis.</i>
Lower Ground floor car park- partially enclosed but vented.	Garage door to car park if closed does not open automatically with fire alarm.	Yes	Consider linking to fire alarm to open on activation of fire alarm (BS 7273-4 / BS5839)

Location	Compartmentation Compliance Standard or fault/deviation noted	Further Investigation warranted	Suggested action or remedy for consideration
Ground floor- external access- Chute Room	Redundant chute has non-compliant "Pink foam" around chute termination. This may be combustible.	Yes	Fire stop using an appropriate method to ASFP/ADB guidance
Ground floor	No fire door to caretaker's corridor from foyer.	Yes	Fit a current BS 476 fire door
Level 2	Fire door damage to staircase	Yes	Repair to FIRAS/BMTrada standard.
Level 5	Carpet applied to bottom of fire door.	Yes	Remove
Level 7	Fire door to staircase has damage and weathering to bottom of door	Yes	Repair to FIRAS/BMTrada standard
Level 8	No fire door to Lift Access Room from corridor	Yes	Fit a current BS 476 fire door to lift access room
Lift Motor Room- within loft space	Hole and void containing soil pipe to floors below not in FR construction / fire protected riser	Yes - (Compartmentation Survey	Survey to see extent
Excessive combustibles	To; 1-Dry riser cupboards 2-Lift room in loft and anteroom 3-Caretakers room 4-Bin chute room	Yes	Remove refuse / excessive combustibles
Private demise cupboards opposite flat entrances	Compartment breaches or non-compliant fire stopping on vertical cable runs (fire stopping appears to be unsecured thermal insulation)	Yes	Fire stop using an appropriate method to ASFP/ADB guidance

Location	Compartmentation Compliance Standard or fault/deviation noted	Further Investigation warranted	Suggested action or remedy for consideration
Combustible wall linings (Wood)	Entrance on ground floor	Yes	Advised to apply intumescent coating to wood?
Each dry riser cupboard	Redundant hose	Yes	Remove redundant hose and fittings

Source: Fire stopping. ASFP red book guidance (4th edition) current standard.

BS 476-part 21/22 BS-EN1634-3 Fire Doors.

ADB Vol 2 (Wales) 2020 says 6.55 page 97; Refuse chutes and rooms provided for the storage of refuse should: be separated from other parts of the building by fire-resisting construction; and b. not be located within protected stairways or protected lobbies.

Bin chute rooms on all floors-(Before 1991 CP3 Chapter IV Part 1 applied - for chutes as follows:

"Refuse chutes should conform to CP 306. The enclosing structure should be of non-combustible materials and should have a fire resistance of not less than one hour or that period required by the Building Regulations for the elements of structure of the building, whichever is the greater. Refuse chute access hoppers should not be in any stairway enclosure or corridor, nor in a stairway protection lobby. Refuse chute enclosures should be ventilated to the open air."

GARTH COURT, ABBEY ROAD -FLAT DEMISE INSPECTION 20% SAMPLE OF PREMISES

Flat Number	Flat Entrance Door Inspection-Compliance Standard to era.	Compartmentation Compliance Standard	Compliance Standard LD2 BS 5839 Part 6
21	<i>Non-compliant- Only 2 hinges and no automatic self-closing device (ASCD)</i>	Compliant- No obvious signs of compartment breach from visual inspection only	Non-Compliant Smoke detector to hall only. No heat detector to kitchen. LD 3. Linked to common area alarm
20	Compliant-Nominal Fire Door-3 hinges and intumescent strip/smoke seal (i/s s/s)	Compliant- No obvious signs of compartment breach from visual inspection only	Non-Compliant Smoke detector to hall only. No heat detector to kitchen. LD 3. Linked to common area alarm
19	<i>Non-compliant- Only 2 hinges and no automatic self-closing device (ASCD). No i/s s/s.</i>	Compliant-No obvious signs of compartment breach from visual inspection only	Non-Compliant Smoke detector to hall only. No heat detector to kitchen. LD 3. Linked to common area alarm
16	Non-compliant: appears to be a hollow core door (All doors level 5 to 2 appear similar)	Compliant-No obvious signs of compartment breach from visual inspection only	Non-Compliant Smoke detector to hall only. No heat detector to kitchen. LD 3. Linked to common area alarm
7	<i>Not compliant-No ASCD present.</i>	Compliant-No obvious signs of compartment breach from visual inspection only	Non-Compliant Smoke detector to hall only. No heat detector to kitchen. LD 3. Linked to common area alarm

Source: Approved Document B vol 2 2021 Wales-
BS 5839 Part 6 smoke/heat detectors. LD 2/3 for flats.BS 5839-part 1 common areas.
BS 476-part 21/22 Fire Doors, BS-EN1634-3

APPENDIX FOUR: PHOTOGRAPHS TO ACCOMPANY THIS REPORT
PLEASE SEE THE ATTACHED PDF.

APPENDIX FIVE: DISCLAIMER ADDENDUM

This report must not be disseminated, manipulated, changed or presented without the consent of The Joint Inspection Team (JIT).

This report has been prepared for the sole benefit, use and information for this project only and the liability of the JIT, its Directors and Employees in respect of the information contained in the report will not extend to any third party.

This report is formulated and based on the information and experience available at the time of preparation. It is applicable to the above-mentioned project only in accordance with the client's instructions. It is only valid provided no other modifications are made other than those for which a formal written permission has been sought and given by the JIT.

The purpose of the report is to undertake an inspection of the premises in a holistic way in order to assist the Freeholder, Responsible Person(s), Local Authorities and relevant duty holders e.g. Building Managers in: Identifying hazards posed to persons on the premises, structural issues, fire safety issues and other health and safety issues relevant to the Housing Act 2004, Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005(as amended), Fire Safety Act 2021, Building Safety Act 2022 (Only Part 3 currently enacted in Wales).

The report is then assessed using the Housing Health and Safety Rating System (HHSRS) to qualitatively and quantitatively give a Hazard score and rating, so as to determine whether enforcement or advisory notices are served by the local authority responsible; or to inform timely remedial actions needed in order to reduce serious category 1 hazards on a voluntary basis.

The inspection will be non-intrusive only, meaning no intrusive surveying will be undertaken. Should areas be identified requiring intrusive inspections, this will be detailed within the report and an action plan identified.

The scope of the report is to consider the status of the building, its use and management with regards to Housing Act 2004 and Regulatory Reform (Fire Safety) Order 2005, to support the Responsible Persons/Duty Holders in undertaking their duties and reducing hazards present during the inspection.

This inspection by the JIT team is based on the methodology of the HHSRS from the Housing Act 2004. The purpose is to identify deficiencies contributing towards hazards and score according to HHSRS Regulations, with the outcome giving a methodically rated appraisal in order to remove category 1 hazards and reduce untenable risk.

It has been assumed that all parts of the building have been designed are in accordance with The Building Regulations applicable at the time of construction if there are observed deviations they will be highlighted and scored under the HHSRS

This report does not include testing of any electrical wiring or the checking of appropriate fuses. All wiring should be regularly tested in accordance with current regulations and appropriate circuit breakers and plugs that contain suitable fuses should protect all electrical installations.

No lighting (emergency or other) levels were taken within the premises as the visits were conducted during the hours of daylight. Any improvements or recommendations are made on a visual basis and may be based on a mixture of information from legislation, British Standards, guidance documents and the professional opinion of the assessor. Any information supplied by the Responsible person, or their representative is taken in good faith.

The JIT do not hold any responsibility for the non-completion and non-implementation of any findings or advice of the assessment or any lack of maintenance of any equipment and systems, staffing levels, the training of staff nor the client's non-compliance with the procedures or recommendations it may have been requested to carry out.

The JIT do not have any responsibility for any subsequent faults in equipment, systems, testing requirements or the deterioration of the premises in any shape or form after the date of the assessment.

The JIT do not hold any responsibility for misguided, incorrect or misrepresented information being given by the client or their representative during the assessment and afterwards where further information may be requested by telephone or electronically.

The ownership of the Inspection report remains with the JIT, and the responsibility for the completion of the any of the findings of the inspection report, the maintenance of any equipment and systems associated with the inspection report and the freeholders premises remains with the freeholder, managing agent or the responsible person(s) of the premises as highlighted (where it was able to be determined) within the report and/or the building owners.